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PREFACE 
(ON ALAIN BADIOU'S HANDWRITING) 
Peter Goodrich* 
A glance at the cover endorsements of Badiou's recently published 
English works rapidly indicates that his is not an opus aimed at the 
faint-hearted. This is philosophy in the grand style and against the grain 
of the times. Attend then to his principal encomiast, Slavoj Zizek, who 
in "praising" Ethics indicates that Badiou's work takes "aim at the very 
heart of politically correct 'radical' intellectuals, undermining the 
foundations of their very mode of life!"i The fragile exclamation mark 
seems to indicate emphasis rather than irony or any self-conscious 
humor. The tenor of the laudation is political and polemical, a 
suspicion that is confirmed by the continuation: ''Ethics enacts a return 
to a full-blown philosophy which strikes as thunder into the morass of 
post-modernist sophisms and platitudes."^ The meteorological 
metaphor, if anything, adds to the stakes in suggesting a celestial source 
and naturalistic force of impact. The heavens open in the wake of the 
philosopher Badiou, or so Zizek appears to believe. And then finally, 
just to confirm the world historical stature of the man and the 
destructive potential of the thought, Zizek adds on the back cover of The 
Century a further lectorial rubric: "Read it with the proper tremor, aware 
that you are reading a classic, that a figure like Plato or Hegel walks 
here among us!"^ 
Philosopher, poet, playwright and aspiring filmmaker—^he wants to 
make, and has indeed got some way in negotiating, a Hollywood biopic 
of the life of Plato—Badiou has taken over the coveted spot of regnant 
French philosopher in the Anglophone world. It is a recent and in many 
respects surprising crowning in that Badiou's lengthy oeuvre is far 
removed from what Cusset dubs "French Theory.'"' It is true that 
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1 ALAIN BADIOU, ETHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF EVIL back cover (Peter 
Hallward trans.. Verso 2007) (1998). 
2 Id 
3 ALAIN BADIOU, THE CENTURY back cover (Alberto Toscano trans., 2007) (2005). 
4 FRANCOIS GUSSET, FRENCH THEORY: FOUCAULT, DERRIDA, DELEUZE & Cm ET LES 
MUTATIONS DE LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE Aux ETATS-UNIS (2003), makes only the most fleeting 
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Badiou is a soixante-huitard, and a hardline Marxist in theoretical 
project and inspiration, but his major work is devoted to the application 
of set theory to the claims of ontology, and is Pythagorean in its 
difficulty as well as being, until very recently, untranslated. Being and 
Evenf is not a work of obvious appeal to the humanities, nor is his 
Maoist metaphysics immediately attractive to a liberal academy still 
recovering from the culture wars. Badiou s reception is evidently a 
complicated matter that devolves around a dual axis of symbolic 
valence. 
First, and this phenomenon developed initially through the 
reception and non-reception of Derrida's work, what matters in the 
politics of transatlantic transmission is a symbolic capital or status of 
the name that is not necessarily correlated to any close reading of the 
work. The sinews of attraction attach increasingly to the figure, to the 
mediological phenomenon,^ to the symbol of a thought, rather than to 
any immediate substance or doctrine.'' Badiou here arrived in the 
Americas first as a follower and protege of Lacan, as a proponent of the 
psychoanalytically inspired matheme, and as a decidedly sub-cultural 
figure. It was as an essayist whose short and esoteric pronouncements 
appeared in clique-chic journals such as Lacanian Ink that Badiou 
developed a certain cachet. He offered pronouncements, positions, in a 
word certainty in the face of liberal doubt. And specifically in terms of 
cultural analysis, he carried forward the politicization of psychoanalysis 
that Althusser had initially, and perhaps tragically, elaborated.^ He 
promised a fiiendship of disciplines, an oracular mapping of the subject 
of such magisterial abstraction, and such mathematical rigor as to both 
dazzle and entrance. 
Second, the essay form, the sound bite, the brief excursiori has 
become the popular public intellectual norm. It is the essays, printed 
from the handwritten texts of his numerous public addresses, that 
of references to Badiou, whom he clearly does not include in his history of French Theory in the 
sub-culture of American University intellectual polities. 
' ALAIN BADIOU. BEING AND EVENT (Oliver Feltham trans.. Continuum 2005) (1988). 
® The analysis of academic fame, the top ten intellectuals, emerges first in the mediological 
work of Regis Debray. See REGIS DEBRAY, TEACHERS, WRITERS, CELEBRITIES: THE 
INTELLECTUALS OF MODERN FRANCE (1976). There is also the highly scathing DOMINIQUE 
LECOURT, THE MEDIOCRACY: FRENCH PHILOSOPHY SMCE THE MID-1970S (2001). The best 
empirical study, though now somewhat dated, is PIERRE BORDIEU, HOMO ACADEMICUS (1988). 
For an American version of similar ilk, though one which lacks any great degree of critical 
theoretical analysis, see RICHARD POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE 
(2003). 
7 On which, and not eoincidentally, see PIERRE BAYARD, How TO TALK ABOUT BOOKS 
You HAVEN'T READ (2007). In a jmistic context, see Tim Murphy, The Habermas Effect: 
Critical Theory and Academic Law, 42 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 135 (1989), and also on citation 
and its lack of influence, see NEIL DUXBURY, JURISTS AND JUDGES: AN ESSAY ON INFLUENCE 
(2001). 
8 LOUIS ALTHUSSER, WRITINGS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS (1999). 
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brought Badiou to the crescendo of attention that he now enjoys in the 
Anglophone world. This is not, of course, to say that the accolades of 
the academy are much heard in the public sphere, nor indeed that 
Badiou as yet has any great status within or hold upon the middle brow 
domains of the higher circulation journals or popular media. He is not 
Derrida or Lacan in terms either of his ability to scandalize or his cross­
over significance. But we also should recognize the philosopher on 
tour, the public speaker, the figure of recognition whose name stands for 
a certain rigor of thought and for a political apprehension of art, 
literature, ethics, epistemology, and now, here, tentatively, law. 
The symposium gathered under the aegis of law and event poses a 
stark paradox. To borrow from Badiou, if law is P then the event is 
non-P. They cannot exist in the same space: "In my philosophical 
vision, in a given world, we have something new only if the rational or 
conventional laws of this world are interrupted, or put out of their 
normal effects, by something which happens, and that 1 name an 
Event."^ The consequences of the Event, Badiou continues, "sustain a 
negative relationship to the laws of the world."'" The Event is in this 
sense subtracted from the world and exists in defiance of precedent or 
prior norm. The Event produces consequences, and these 
consequences, these multiple fidelities, are together what Badiou terms 
a truth. In jurisprudential argot, the Event thus constitutes the opposite 
of precedent, the exception, the inversion or shadow of the norm. 
Truth, the set of consequences of the Event, "is like a negation of the 
world"" precisely because the Event is subtracted from the visible, 
promulgated, conscious and repeated laws of what is in the world, 
meaning institution, convention, and norm. Note finally that a truth, 
being a transgression of law, a novelty, both depends upon the law and 
is a negation of it. 
Badiou stands jurisprudence on its head. He will ruffle some 
feathers. No question. Professor Legrand, to take one radical example, 
already intimates a certain negative affect in the amusing prosonomasia 
of his tentatively dismissive title "Bad u . . . in this volume. 
Legrand does not follow up on this occasion, his title seems rather in the 
vein of a prolegomenon, an exercise in subtle prolepsis, the figure of 
some fiuther critique yet to come. His substantive discussion rather 
adopts the neutral stance, or in juridical terms strategy of building a 
case, through a lengthy, painstaking, and apparently disinterested 
accounting of the interstices of Badiou's thought. The litigation has not 
yet begun, or at least not in print. There is simply a hint, a title, a name. 
® Alain Badiou, The Three Negations. 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1877, 1878 (2008). 
Id. 
" Id. 
Pierre Legrande, Badu . .  . ? ,  29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2153 (2008). 
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And this naming, of course, is in rhetorical parlance a highly significant 
gesture, a rallying calling, both nomen and omen as has been observed, 
not least by Badiou himself, before. Prosonomasia—ih.Q figare of the 
nickname—^nominates in a novel and dismissive manner, and in that 
most singular and surface of senses it ruptures the extant vocabulary, or 
more figuratively one can say that it undoes the lex of the lexicon. At 
the same time, and as a more general point, lawyers are not fond of 
novelty. According to the maxims of common law, it disturbs, perturbs, 
or it is, in the determination of the legal tradition, novel only in 
declaring the old law one more time; novum judicium non dot jus 
novum, sed declarat antiquum. Law, by convention or position, always 
already exists. It is promulgation or precedent, prerogative or 
pontification, custom or use, and it is law precisely and only to the 
extent of its prior existence. No punishment, after all, sine lege, without 
prior law. It is in this sense that the authors of common law state with 
some stringency that where the law is vague, uncertain, ill-defined, the 
sociality exists in a state of misery.'^ Thus, just to grasp the obvious, 
Badiou threatens law with a certain misery, a distance from itself, a 
minimal intensity and hence, to coin a phrase, an analytic unhappiness. 
An Event, and here Badiou is not far from Kuhn's theory of 
scientific revolutions applied to social structures, is a paradigm-
changing instance, a revolution, a white-hot intensity that makes the 
weaker the stronger, the minimal the maximal and so on."* Here we see 
or sense the underside of law, the claim of justice, understood as the 
demand of the excluded, the return of the hidden, the expression of 
what, for want of a better formulation, could be called a para-
inconsistency. By this I mean a breaking away, a fissure in the social 
structure in which laws that are not laws emerge and fade in precisely 
the degree of their fidelity to the spirit of the Event. The legal, which is 
general and abstracted, is abandoned in favor of the non-legal, indeed 
the illegal, although here too the ascending intensity of the new group or 
social formation is subject to its own laws, its own instances of naining, 
dividing, distributing, and most important of all for Badiou, equalizing. 
The rise and fall of law, the minimal intensity that Badiou 
attributes to the juridical, can be understood best in terms of the 
opposition between state imposed regulation, a democracy and its laws 
that express or favor certain interests and classes as against others, and a 
political and expressive autonomy which, in time will have its own 
name, but for now is formulated in terms of equality. The stages of the 
argument are necessarily Trinitarian, or so Schtitz suggests, and devolve 
13 Res est misera ubi jus est vagum et incertum, or more strongly: Ubijus incertum, ibijus 
""^'"""Reference, of course, is to THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
(1970). 
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slowly towards a better future, be it some form of pneumatic anarchy or 
free association. The premise of the argument, first hypothesis, is that 
state and law represent inequality, injustice, and at best political stasis 
or more strongly infidelity to the Event. For the radical and egalitarian, 
law is thus an unnecessary manacle, a regressive tie, in Marx's terms a 
chain to be lost, a bond whose progressive essence lies in being 
unbound. ... 
Remaining specifically with the question of law and its critique, 
with Badiou's expressive dissolution of Jurisprudence, the unloosing or 
disaggregating of the bonds of law has a dual function. First, it serves 
to challenge the hierarchy and imposition of law, displacing legality 
with politics, decision with a space for thought. Second, in 
marginalizing or diminishing the authority of law, this unbound politics 
also dissolves the generality, the state sponsored groups, the hierarchies 
and status capital upon which inequality depends. Thus, and with all 
due respect to the bravura critique of Badiou made orally by Professor 
Legrand, it is the subject as particularity, the singular universal that 
interests Badiou. This leads to our third point, the abolitionist 
conclusion, the positively anarchic idea that the thinker of the Event, 
perhaps we can call it 'evental thought', is a thinking from a future or 
purely speculative position beyond law, after politics, and within a 
collectivity of free association. Viewed from such a point, and however 
ecclesiastical this promised future, this imagined or heavenly space may 
seem, it does allow for a certain rigor, a radical purity, a delightful 
irreverence even towards the hypocritical and regressive claims of law. 
It is law that is blindfolded, justice that sees, or in Badiou's Pauline 
formulation, "Every letter is blind and operates blindly When the 
subject is under the letter, or literal, he presents himself as a 
disconnected correlation between an automatism of doing and a 
powerlessness of thought."'^ 
Badiou, philosopher of the Event, wields his version of Joachim of 
Fiore's tripartite schema, although outside of occasional, handwritten 
insertions of allusions to Marx, he prefers the reference to Saint Paul. 
Law deadens. Law kills. The spirit, grace, justice give life and in 
particular allow the novel (the novum) to appear in its singularity, in its 
equality and hence also its universality. It is from the perspective of 
such singular universality that Badiou thinks the social and the subject. 
Taking a phrase from Critchley, they merely axel^ It is the uniqueness 
of the subject and the free association of such singularities or 'ones' that 
constitutes an unbound collectivity, a future space, a site of fidelity in 
15 ALAIN BADIOU, SAINT PAUL: THE FOUNDATION OF UNIVBRSALISM 84 (Ray Brassier 
trans., Stanford University Press 2003) (1997). 
16 SIMON CRITCHLEY, THINGS MERELY ARE 11 (2005). Proposition 9: "Poetry allows us to 
see things as they are." Id. 
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and of thought. The support of justice, of the antonym or negation of 
law, Badiou concludes, citing Celan, is inconsistency, meaning an 
unbound singularity, a judgment premised not upon law but upon 
truth.i' Enough said. The rest is poetry or hieroglyphics, theatre or 
operatics, depending upon your point of view. 
I have made no attempt to summarize or survey the wealth of 
contributions—the concatenation of persons and papers, at a specific 
time and place—^to the symposium that follows. There are many and 
diverse highlights, numerous foibles, and throughout a very apparent 
authenticity to the event. The purpose of the gathering was simply 
and yet isn't this the point of any philosophy of law that avoids the 
temptation to analytic retrogression?—^to open a space of thought within 
law, to address and assess a beyond of law within the confines of the 
legal. The task of analyzing this antinomy between law and justice, 
between jurisprudence and its negation, was elaborated in numerous 
forms. Badiou offers a species of shadow play, an imaginary beyond of 
law located in thought and in images of future possibilities, in hope 
beyond hope. Thus rich and forgotten strands of the legal tradition 
concerned with law and enigma, with nocturnal judgments, with night 
thoughts, opera and dreams, pneumatic anarchy and disaggregated 
collectivity were all and variously opened up and happily revised. That 
is not my point. These contributions can be perused at leisure or online. 
I want rather to finish with what was said but wasn't published, with 
images, with the handwritten, with the record of that which remains 
indelibly off the record. 
If only. Allow me my inconsistencies. The handwritten lecture, 
which I obtained by means of a subtle and persistent persuasion, shows 
a Gallic hand, an upright chirography concerned in form and content 
with the present, with politics in actu, and most obviously of all, granted 
the pleasing aesthetic of insertions, crossings out and diverse arriere 
pensees graphically added, with a strikingly mobile, eventful process of 
thinking these negations of law. Put it like this. The lecture was written 
for the occasion. Handwritten, as it happens, meaning, as the figures 
show, inscribed, read, revised, annotated, ordered and reordered to 
capture the line of thought, the progress or unraveling of the ideas, as 
directly as linear transcription, manuscript, can permit. 
17 ALAIN BADIOU, METAPOLITICS 105(2005). 
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h tU &tv» irj 
riu t* n •«* •w«i<l«<( ^ wILjffiJj «*.fv)t<( 
c f Q U  . 5 *  * < *  C»« 0^ 
'<!' \t  ̂ C'<<iywMr>^>/l»^ UliltL , *«'\ *'1" "fe"^ • 
« «»-A »f c«» LUil- • U»-<< i « "T*""-
^ tfiCMvi ^ u 1' 
(AVCwVW^ 
^ ^ \ Wl CM «A •* 
f^ u—f4 , «. iMiCiUi ir-iwW ^ 1 "f * ̂  • 
c-.«:;SJ<  ̂ wrf.l:u/ bwV  ̂ j^U^'<U,:f..{!„ 
/oviti (Iwj^ «.i 4n«-j. 
(f| )«'aVjj 1 cf« c«»t4A.-cb-^ &Mk< 
|ov««. »-i ^ ̂  , jj.v ;y I ?>»» _ 
in^ lU^A^ iuMf^wwiV 0^ •!/ lî  £M« 31 
«M\ >• —A- 4im ,1 4»feu,4:»< 
£«• 41»o li. i»iiy 
•f •j 4lMtiy tff ? 
Figure 1 
The first lexical insertions, in this order, as the thought warms to 
its task, are "often," "many," "of the Event," and "by Marx." The figure 
of insertion is, of course, parenthesis, and is defined rhetorically, by 
Puttenham and others, as that of 'tolerable disorder'.'^ Puttenham goes 
on to add that the insertion is "utterly impertinent to the principal 
matter, and makes a great gap in the tale, nevertheless is no disgrace but 
rather a beauty and to very good purpose ... 
If the handwriting is closely formed, intense, focused, and overall 
well ordered, alternately leaning back and waving forward the figure of 
18 See GEORGE PUTTENHAM, THE ART OF ENGLISH POESY 252 (Frank Whigham & Wayne 
Rebhom eds., 2007) (1589). 
19 Id at 253. 
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insertion, as its somewhat enigmatic emblem seems to fit well. 
vti. j-i-v-
:  . ' ^ V  u , a L  
UlC u ll)~ . IT* Y 
' k . . jJ. U # ... <K \ 
1— "Tt# wi^aVlw t""" 
I— H^AVW »!»)-
4^r 
J , itl 1^1^ (fi kX&Jtti ^4iJL ! '•f* 
ij| r«>t4.*(^ 
^ . tC MyJU. i(Jfy —JU OlJuW ^ 
f-« r'«V *,.7^ \ 
jMc^ii- (.,.•-< (I—kr. U -. «;» t.A.3 li•^ HI 
tU ji. (l^ «L c~i.w^ -i t-r- •" 
., A « . Ti. «~l I. A >->.-.k^>»-
({„ Ali lj» A.\ u M  X i /  
^4 J«V^ <j 
(i u.jf». 4<i«t ,*• ~*;5:^; 
(iL Tik fidfc - (^) 
k ^ #1 N)«l.v *ki 1 
«Mn\ w««k iri^ - ^'<4? / 
[^ i^ykL'u* f lit) 'Mf*u* 4 . 
Figure 2 
Badiou offers, and this has been my theme, a shadow play, a 
spectral dance of hidden laws, juristic chimera that in their very 
evanescence promise a justice to come. But then, just as the insertion 
undoes the order of the sentence, imbinds the grammar, the fibres of a 
thinking that takes place outside of law, from the perspective of an 
event yet to come, are bound to generate ire, opposition, both love and 
hate from lawyers. That is what happened, though not necessarily or 
entirely what is reported or recorded here. It can take us back to the 
opening encomia for Badiou in which Zizek s hyperbole uncannily 
conjures the image of a contemporary Gargantua, though Rabelais is in 
truth very distant from us today. That said, the explosive and gigantic 
are proper connotations of the Event. The author of evental theory 
should himself be eventful. He should clap like thunder and rain like a 
monsoon, at least in thought. Badiou is here, in this description, a 
sonorous brontologist, and that is in many respects an admirable 
p o s i t i o n  a n d  p r o f e s s i o n .  A n d  h e  s h o u l d  b e  b a d ,  o r  i n d e e d  B a d  u  . . . ,  
to borrow the earlier adverted prosonomasia. 
The phonetic play upon the name—and we can of course properly 
ask of what is "Bad w" the name?—offers one rhyming indicator of 
reaction. Another play upon the name would be to trace it to Badaud 
and thence to bavarder or to chatter, meaning someone wordy, prolix. 
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prone to overstatement and with a penchant for rumor and gossip. 
Someone open-mouthed in Proven9aI slang. And several participants 
hinted at a very legitimate criticism of Badiou for being too expansive, a 
merchant of overstatement or more technically, but I doubt that anyone 
is paying any attention to that, a premature universalizer. But there is 
more. The name has etymological roots in the Germanic combination 
of badu and wald, meaning respectively battle and rule. A combative 
and conflictual name, connoting both law and resistance, rule and 
insertion, hierarchy and the event that undoes it. 
Return if you will to the orthography as represented in the two 
figures reproduced in this Preface. We can look at this process of 
thought as a style of handvmting, and here specifically of a procedure of 
inscription, erasure, amendment and insertion. Note then the difference 
between the two pages. It is marginal yet noticeable that there is a shift, 
a slippage between the humanistic, or even glossatorial, mode of Figure 
1, with its column and comment in the lower right hand comer, and the 
mathematical, even algebraic, quality of the tabular arrangement in 
Figure 2. The first insertions are basically lexical, or properly speaking 
paraleptic, meaning that they introduce a further reference. A name or 
term is inserted, Marx for example, and a distant figure, an enigmatic 
further text is added to break up the argument, to distract or direct to an 
elsewhere, to another thought, a shadow law or possibility. In Figure 2, 
by contrast, Badiou the mathematician, the jurist—if we can so term the 
philosopher king—is more in evidence. Flere he is erasing and adding 
tables, equations, lists. This is the domain of the calculable, of the mle, 
of that which is known in advance, quantified, tabled and listed. These 
appear if not as laws, then at least as negative desiderata, as 
interdictions, speculations that are not to be infracted. These are the 
marks of method, ordinances, nomos as it is explicated beyond both law 
and its transgression. 
The separate parts war with each other, the humanist with the 
legislator, the aesthete with the mathematical ontologist. Justice, or the 
desire for a justice to come, confronts calculus, the many challenge the 
one. The erasure or undoing of bonds, the war implicit in the name and 
in the text are polemical and provocative. The root in battle also 
reminds us, and Simon Critchley is critical of this, of the violence of 
some of Badiou's positions. The shadow play in other words is also a 
species of resistance in the French sense of covert armed resistance. 
The sovereign, to borrow a very old legal maxim, is graced with arms 
and with laws, swords and books.As law and war have tended 
increasingly to go hand in hand, the contemporary translation of the 
maxim should probably counterpose not arms and laws, but law and 
20 Peter Birks & Grant McLeod, Introduction to JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES (Peter Birks & 
Grant McLeod trans., Cornell University Press 1987). 
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philosophy because it is the philosophers who have taken over the 
books while the lawyers merge with the febrile sterility of the 
contemporary war torn world. Badiou is the progenitor of an insertion 
into this realm of compromise, his is a disorderly thought, and he is to 
be thanked fulsomely for that, for living up to his name. 
